Individual decision-makers consume information revealed by the previous decision makers, and produce information that may help in future decision makers. This phenomenon is common in a wide range of scenarios in the Internet economy, as well as elsewhere, such as medical decisions. Each decision maker when required to select an action, would individually prefer to exploit, select the highest expected reward action conditional on her information. At the same time, each decision maker would prefer previous decision makers to explore, producing information about the rewards of various actions. A social planner, by means of carefully designed information disclosure, can incentivize the agents to balance the exploration and exploitation, and maximize social welfare.
INTRODUCTION
Decisions made by an individual often reveal information about the world that can be useful to others. For example, the decision to dine in a particular restaurant may reveal some observations about this particular restaurant. This revelation could be achieved by posting a photo, writing a review, tweeting, etc. Others can consume this information either directly (photo, review, tweet, etc.) or indirectly (through aggregations or summarizations). Thus, individuals have a dual role: they both consume information (from previous individuals) and produce information (for future individuals). This is definitely not limited to restaurants, but very broadly, the choice of a product or experience, be it a movie, hotel, book, home appliance, or virtually any other consumer's choice, leads to an individual's subjective observations pertaining to this choice. These subjective observations can be recorded and collected, e.g., when the individual ranks a product or leaves a review, and can help others make similar choices in similar circumstances in a hopefully more informed way. Collecting, aggregating and presenting such observations is a crucial part of numerous businesses in the modern Internet economy, such as TripAdvisor, Yelp, Netflix, Amazon, Waze and many others.
Similar issues, albeit possibly with much higher stakes, arise in medical decisions: selecting a doctor or hospital, selecting a drug or treatment, and deciding whether to participate in a medical trial. First the individual can consult information from similar individuals in the past to the extent that it is available, and later, he can contribute her experience as a review or as an outcome in a medical trial.
In the information-revealing decisions discussed above, each individual decisionmaker would typically exploit: choose the best alternative given the information available so far, whereas it may be better for the society that some individuals explore: try out an unknown alternative for the sake of gathering more information, at the risk of a worse individual experience. A social planner would like to direct the individuals to combine exploration and exploitation so as to maximize the social welfare, which results in the exploration-exploitation tradeoff, a well-known subject in Machine Learning, Operation Research and Economics. When the decisions are made by individuals we have a third dimension, based on the individuals incentives. While the social planner benefits from both exploration and exploitation, the former collecting information to eventually help the latter, each individual decision-maker typically only cares about exploitation. In particular, if a specific alternative appears suboptimal given the information available so far, however sparse and incomplete, then this alternative might remain unexplored -even though in reality it may be the best.
The focus of this work is how to incentivize self-interested decision-makers to explore without using any monetary incentives. We are primarily interested in exploration that is efficient from the social planner's perspective, i.e., exploration that optimizes the social welfare. We consider a version of a social planner who cannot control the decision-makers, but can communicate with them, e.g., recommend an action and observe the outcome later on. Such a planner would typically be implemented via a website, either one dedicated to recommendations and feedback collection (such as Yelp or Waze), or one that actually provides the product or experience being recommended (such as Netflix or Amazon).
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On a technical level, we consider an algorithm design problem with an exploreexploit tradeoff and auxiliary incentive-compatibility constraints. Absent these constraints, our problem reduces to multi-armed bandits (MAB), the paradigmatic and well-studied setting for exploration-exploitation tradeoffs, and various generalizations thereof. Our main focus is on the case of stochastic payoffs and on minimizing the regret. We make two contributions: we fully resolve the asymptotic regret rates achieveable with incentive compatible exploration for a constant number of actions and we provide a reduction from an arbitrary learning algorithm to an incentive-compatible one; this reduction "works" for a much more general explore-exploit setting. While the expected utility received by an individual is determined by the chosen action, we allow the realized reward to be stochastic. The prior work of Kremer et al. [2014] mainly focuses on deriving the exact optimal policy for MAB with only two actions and deterministic rewards (and only obtaining a preliminary result for stochastic rewards).
Our scope
We consider the following abstract framework, called incentive-compatible exploration. The social planner is an algorithm that interacts with the self-interested decisionmakers (henceforth, agents) over time. In each round, an agent arrives, chooses one action among several alternatives, receives a reward for the chosen action, and leaves forever. Before an agent makes her choice, the planner sends a message to the agent which includes a recommended action. Everything that happens in a given round is observed by the planner, but not by other agents. The agent has a Bayesian prior on the rewards, and chooses an action that maximizes its Bayesian expected reward given the algorithm's message (breaking ties in favor of the recommended action). The agent's prior is known to the planner, either fully or partially. We require the planner's algorithm to be Bayesian incentive-compatible (henceforth, BIC), in the sense that each agent's Bayesian expected reward is maximized by the recommended action. A typical goal is to design a BIC algorithm so as to maximize social welfare, i.e., the cumulative reward of all agents. On a high level, we seek BIC algorithms whose performance is similar to the optimal algorithm for the corresponding setting (BIC or not).
A paradigmatic example is the setting introduced in Kremer et al. [2014] , where the set of possible actions is the same for all agents, the algorithm's message to each agent is some arbitrary information (which without loss of generality is a recommended action), and the reward is an independent draw from a distribution determined only by the chosen action. The reward distribution is not known neither to the agents nor to the planner. All agents share a common Bayesian prior on the reward distribution, which is also known to the planner. No other information is received by the planner's algorithm or an agent (apart from the prior, the recommended arm, and the reward). We call this setting BIC bandit exploration. Absent the BIC constraint, it reduces to the MAB problem with IID rewards and Bayesian priors. In what follows, we generalize this setting in several directions, both in terms of the machine learning problem being solved by the planner's algorithm, and in terms of the mechanism design assumptions on the information structure (see Section 1.4 for details).
Throughout this paper, the algorithm's message to each agent is restricted to being the recommended action.
2 While some applications, especially those related to medicine, may require the algorithm to reveal additional information, these requirements are typically application-specific, and we do not attempt to model them. Unless specified otherwise, the set of possible actions is the same for all agents, and the number of actions is an absolute constant.
Our contributions: BIC bandit exploration
Following the literature on MAB, we measure an algorithm's performance via regret. Informally, it is the extent to which the algorithm "regrets" not knowing the best action in advance. Formally, it is the difference, in terms of the cumulative expected reward, between the algorithm and the the best fixed action. The literature distinguishes bounds on regret that depend on the MAB instance -mapping from an action to the corresponding expected reward -and ones that hold for all MAB instances. One is primarily interested in the asymptotic dependence of regret on the time horizon and (in the former case) on the gap: the difference between the largest and second-largest expected rewards in the MAB instance, which is denoted by ∆.
Our results. We provide a BIC algorithm whose regret is essentially optimal among all MAB algorithms with a constant number of actions, both in the "instancedependent" sense and in the worst case over all MAB instances. We achieve regret
where T is the time horizon, ∆ is the gap, c 0 is an absolute constant, and c P is a constant that depends only on the common prior P. A well-known lower bound states that one cannot achieve regret better than O(min(
Further, our algorithm is detail-free, in the sense that it requires very little knowledge of the common prior P. This is desirable because in practice it may be complicated or impossible to elicit the prior exactly. The prior is taken into account through the ranking ρ P of the actions in terms of their prior mean rewards and two numbers k * P and L P which are related to the strength of the agents' initial beliefs in favor of some arm. The algorithm is parameterized by the ranking ρ P and two numbers k * , L (number of samples collected in the initial stage of the algorithm and phase length in the initial stage of the algorithm) such that the algorithm is BIC as long as k
Moreover, computing these two constants k * P and L P requires only minimal knowledge of the prior distribution of each mean (only the expected value of each prior and the value of the cumulative density function at two points). This result has some surprising practical consequences: -Agents can have different priors P as long as they are "compatible" with the planner's prior: agree on the ranking ρ P and satisfy k * P < k * and L P ≤ L. -An agent does not need to know her own prior. She would trust the planner's algorithm recommendation as long as she believes that their priors are "compatible", in the above sense.
Our contributions: a general "black-box" reduction
While we already provide an algorithm for BIC bandit exploration, one may wish to implement a particular approach to exploration that is different from ours. For example, one may need to incorporate some constraints on the losses due to exploration, or preferences about which arms to favor or throttle in exploration. We provide a "black-box" reduction from MAB algorithms to BIC algorithms. Given an arbitrary MAB algorithm A, we provide a BIC algorithm A IC that interleaves exploitation and calls to A. We focus on Bayesian regret of A IC in T rounds -regret in expectation over the prior P, denoted R P (A IC ; T ). Bayesian regret of A IC increases by at most a constant multiplicative factor c P that only depends on the prior P:
Further, our reduction incurs very little loss in terms of the average reward. Specifically, let V P (A; [τ 1 , τ 2 ]) be the average expected reward per agent among the agents in the time interval [τ 1 , τ 2 ], if they follow algorithm A when the prior is P. Then
where c P and L P are two constants that depend only on the prior P. In words, if we ignore the first c P agents in the execution of A IC , the average expected reward per agent for the next T agents is at least that of the first T /L P agents in the original algorithm A.
While we are motivated by alternative MAB algorithms aimed at maximizing the social welfare, our reduction is much more general, and can handle any MAB algorithm. For example consider a MAB algorithm aimed at detecting the worse reward action. (This can be motivated by the planer's desire to eliminate bad actions by other means, say legislation.) Clearly, no agent would agree to follow such a MAB algorithm, but our 3 More precisely: any MAB algorithm has regret at least Ω(min( 1 ∆ log T, √ T )) in the worst case over all MAB instances with two actions, time horizon T and gap ∆ [Lai and Robbins 1985a; Auer et al. 2002b]. reduction would make it IC to follow the resulting IC MAB. (Clearly, in such a case, the regret and reward bounds above are uninteresting.)
Our "black-box" reduction is based on a variant of the same technique as the previous algorithm. Conceptually, it demonstrates that our technique is not tied to a specific approach to exploration.
1.4. Our contributions: the "black-box" reduction in a general setting
We also extend the "black-box" reduction result to a much more general setting where each agent comes with a signal (context) which can include demographics, tastes, preferences and other agent-specific information. The context, observable by both the agent and the algorithm, impacts the rewards received by this agent, as well as the agent's beliefs about these rewards. Formally, in each round one has context x and expected reward r a for each action a in the action set A, so that the tuple (x; r a : a ∈ A) is drawn IID from some distribution D, called contextual MAB instance. This distribution is not known neither to the agents nor to the algorithm. However, both the agents and the algorithm share a publicly known Bayesian prior P on the contextual MAB instance. When the context x is revealed, an agent can update her Bayesian posterior on the rewards. In particular, this allows agents to have different beliefs about their rewards.
Absent the BIC requirement, the machine learning problem reduces to contextual bandits with IID rewards/contexts [Langford and Zhang 2007] . An algorithm's performance is measured relative to the best policy -mapping from contexts to actions -in a given class Π of feasible policies. One defines contextual regret: informally, the extent to which the algorithm "regrets" not knowing the best policy in advance, quantified as a loss in expected reward. One is primarily interested in the asymptotic dependence of contextual regret on the time horizon T and the number of policies |Π|. The optimal dependence is, resp.,Õ( √ T ) and O( √ log |Π|) [Dudik et al. 2011 ]. Contextual bandits is a very flexible setting, as the policy class Π can encode problem-specific structure and/or available heuristics for supervised learning. Algorithms are typically stated for an arbitrary Π, which is then represented via an oracle that implements supervised learning over Π. Even a single such algorithm in fact represents a collection of algorithms, one for each oracle. Ideally, one would like to provide a BIC implementation for all of these algorithms. This makes a general reduction result particularly desirable.
Our results. We provide a reduction from an arbitrary contextual bandit algorithm A to a BIC algorithm A IC for our setting. We focus on the Bayesian contextual regret of A IC : contextual regret in expectation over the prior P; denote it R P (A IC ; T, |Π|). We prove that the Bayesian contextual regret of A IC increases compared to that of A by at most a constant factor c P that only depends on P:
Further, apart from (or even instead of) optimizing social welfare, an algorithm may be learning something over time. The most natural object to learn in a contextual MAB setting is the best policy: a policy π ∈ Π with the largest expected reward for a given contextual MAB instance. To model this, we can assume that A outputs a predicted best policy π t ∈ Π after each round t. More generally, we assume that A outputs a prediction ϕ t ∈ Φ after each round t, where Φ is some fixed set of possible predictions.
Our BIC algorithm A IC learns as fast as A, up to a constant factor. Formally, A IC outputs a prediction ϕ * t ∈ Φ after each round t, with the following guarantee: for every fixed contextual MAB instance and each round t, the prediction ϕ * t has the same distribution as ϕ ⌊t/cP ⌋ . (Here c P is a constant that depends only on the prior P.) For example, if A gives an asymptotically optimal error rate O(t −1/2 ) for learning the best policy, then so does A IC , up to a prior-dependent multiplicative factor.
Extensions. In practice, agents' choices may reveal more information than respective rewards. For example, an agent's review of a given restaurant may contain not only the agents' evaluation of her experience in this restaurant (i.e., her reward), but also her opinions about the cuisine to which this restaurant belongs. The latter represents partial information about the rewards of some other actions. We extend the above results to a machine learning setting with arbitrary feedback structure: in each round, the outcome of choosing a given action a ∈ A includes not only the agent's reward r a for this action but also arbitrary additional feedback f a observed by the algorithm. The IID assumption extends to the feedback: the tuple (x; r a , f a : a ∈ A) is drawn IID from some latent distribution D. The contextual bandit algorithm A can incorporate this additional feedback in an arbitrary way, and our BIC algorithm A IC matches A up to a constant factor, in the same sense as above. Kremer et al. [2014] focused on the special case of deterministic rewards and two actions, and obtained an exact Bayesian optimal solution for that case. They also obtained a preliminary result for two actions in the general case of BIC bandit exploration. We improve over the latter result in several ways, detailed below. First, the BIC algorithm in Kremer et al. [2014] has regretÕ(T 2/3 ) for all MAB instances, whereas we achieve regretÕ( √ T ). This is considered a significant improvement in the literature on MAB. Second, we obtain the first BIC algorithm with polylog(T ) regret for MAB instances with constant gap. In the literature on MAB, such result expresses the advantage of IID rewards over adversarially chosen rewards (whereas both admit O( √ T ) regret in the worst case). Third, the crucial conceptual improvement is adaptive exploration: in our algorithm, the exploration schedule is adapted to the previous observations, so that the exploration of low-performing actions is phased out early. Whereas the algorithm in Kremer et al. [2014] is a BIC implementation of a "naive" MAB algorithm in which the exploration schedule is fixed in advance. Any such algorithm cannot have regret better thanÕ(T 2/3 ) in the worst case, and cannot achieve polylog(T ) regret for MAB instances with constant gap [Babaioff et al. 2014] . Fourth, Kremer et al. [2014] only consider the case of two actions, whereas we handle an arbitrary constant number of actions. Finally, the algorithm in Kremer et al. [2014] requires all agents to have the same prior, and requires a very detailed knowledge of that prior. Both are significant impediments in practice.
Comparison to prior work
Motivated by the same applications in the Internet economy, Che and Hörner [2013] propose a model with a continuous information flow and a continuum of consumers arriving to a recommendation system and derive a Bayesian-optimal incentivecompatible policy. Their model is technically different from ours, and is restricted to two arms and binary rewards. Further related work is discussed in the full version, including: incentivizing exploration with payments [Frazier et al. 2014] ; the strategic experimentation and Bayesian persuasion in Economics [Bolton and Harris 1999; Keller et al. 2005; Rayo and Segal 2010; Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011; Manso 2011; Ely et al. 2015; Hörner and Skrzypacz 2015] ; background on MAB [Bubeck and CesaBianchi 2012; Gittins et al. 2011] ; most relevant work on MAB with IID rewards [Lai and Robbins 1985b; Auer et al. 2002a ] and contextual bandits [Auer et al. 2002b; Langford and Zhang 2007; Dudik et al. 2011; Agarwal et al. 2014] ; other MAB problems involving self-interested agents such as dynamic pricing and dynamic auctions, [e.g., Babaioff et al. 2015; Besbes and Zeevi 2009; Bergemann and Said 2011; Badanidiyuru et al. 2013 ]; MAB-like models for crowdsourcing [e.g., Slivkins and Vaughan 2013 ].
Discussion and techniques
The mechanism design challenge in BIC exploration is to incentivize the agents to explore actions that appear suboptimal. This comes in two flavors: suboptimal given the information available to the algorithm, and suboptimal according to the agent's Bayesian prior. Both are feasible because of information asymmetry: essentially, the algorithm knows more than the agents do. The fact that the algorithm recommends a given action to an agent reveals to this agent a carefully chosen amount of additional information. Given this additional information, agents' beliefs are updated so that the recommended action now seems preferable to others, even though the algorithm may be exploring and the prior mean reward of this action may be small.
Our algorithms are based on (versions of) a common building block: an algorithm that incentivizes agents to explore at least once during a relatively short time interval ("phase"). The idea is to hide the exploration round randomly among many exploitation rounds. Due to information asymmetry, the agent receiving a recommendation does not know whether this is an "explore" or "exploit" recommendation. However, the agents' Bayesian posterior favors the recommended action, essentially because the "exploit" option is much more likely. The exploitation decision is based on the outcomes of some rounds before the current phase. Information asymmetry is created because the agent cannot observe neither the previous rounds nor the algorithm's randomness.
BIC bandit exploration becomes much easier if the agents' prior is symmetric, in the sense that all actions have the same prior mean reward. For this special case, an existing bandit algorithm from Even-Dar et al. [2006] is incentive compatible. Moreover (under a slightly stronger assumption) one has a very simple version of the "black-box" reduction from Section 1.3. This paper is mainly concerned with the general case when the agents' prior mean reward of various actions are different.
Map of the paper
We present the model and preliminaries in Section 2. Section 3 presents a basic technique to incentivize the initial exploration. The black box reduction from an arbitrary MAB algorithm is given in Section 4. The detail-free BIC algorithm that achieves optimal ex-post regret is given in Section 5. Section 6 gives the generalization to the contextual bandit setting, while more involved settings, such as extra feedback, are deferred to the full version. We conclude with Section 7. Discussion of further related work, the detailed analysis of the multiple arms, the analysis of contextual bandits and their generalizations appear in the full version of the paper [Mansour et al. 2015] .
MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We define the basic model, called BIC bandit exploration; the generalizations are discussed in Section 6. A sequence of T agents arrive sequentially to a principal. In each round t, the interaction protocol is as follows: a new agent arrives, the principal sends this agent a signal σ t , the agent chooses an action i t in a set A of actions, receives a reward for this action, and leaves forever. The signal σ t includes a recommended action I t ∈ A. This entire interaction is not observed by other agents. The principal knows the value of T . However, in most cases a very coarse upper bound would suffice, with only a constant degradation of our results.
The principal chooses signals σ t using an algorithm, called recommendation algorithm. If σ t = I t = i t (i.e., the signal is restricted to the recommended action, which is followed by the corresponding agent) then the setting reduces to multi-armed bandits (MAB), and the recommendation algorithm is a bandit algorithm. To follow the MAB terminology, we will use arms synonymously with actions; we sometimes write "play/pull an arm" rather than "choose an action".
Rewards.
For each arm i there is a parametric family D i (·) of reward distributions, parameterized by the expected reward µ i . The reward vector µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ m ) is drawn from some prior distribution P 0 . Conditional on the mean µ i , the realized reward when a given agent chooses action i is drawn independently from distribution D i (µ i ). In this paper we restrict attention to the case of single parameter families of distributions, however we do not believe this is a real restriction for our results to hold.
The prior P 0 and the tuple D = (D i (·) : i ∈ A) constitute the (full) Bayesian prior on rewards, denoted P. It is known to all agents and to the principal. 4 The expected rewards µ i are not known to either.
For each arm i, let P Incentive-compatibility. Each agent t maximizes her own Bayesian expected reward, conditional on any information that is available to him. Recall that the agent observes the principal's message σ t , and does not observe anything about the previous rounds. Therefore, the agent simply chooses an action i that maximizes the posterior mean reward E[µ i |σ t ]. In particular, if the signal does not contain any new information about the reward vector µ, then the agent simply chooses an action i that maximizes the prior mean reward E[µ i ].
Equivalently, the algorithm is BIC if the recommended action i = I t maximizes the posterior mean reward E[µ i |σ t ]. We will say that the algorithm is strongly BIC if Inequality (2) is always strict.
Throughout this paper, we focus on BIC recommendation algorithms with σ t = I t . As observed in Kremer et al. [2014] , this restriction is w.l.o.g. in the following sense. First, any recommendation algorithm can be made BIC by re-defining I t to lie in argmax i E[µ i |σ t ]. Second, any BIC recommendation algorithm can be restricted to σ t = I t , preserving the BIC property. Note that the first step may require full knowledge of the prior and may be computationally expensive.
Thus, for each agent the recommended action is at least as good as any other action. For simplicity, we assume the agents break ties in favor of the recommended action. Then the agents always follow the recommended action.
Regret. The goal of the recommendation algorithm is to maximize the expected social welfare, i.e., the expected total reward of all agents. For BIC algorithms, this is just the total expected reward of the algorithm in the corresponding instance of MAB.
We measure algorithm's performance via the standard definitions of regret.
Definition 2.2 (Regret). The regret of the algorithm (a.k.a. per-instance regret) is:
4 As mentioned in Introduction, we also consider an extension to a partially known prior.
The Bayesian regret of the algorithm is:
The per-instance regret is specific to a particular reward vector µ; in the MAB terminology, it is sometimes called MAB instance. In (3) the expectation is taken over the randomness in the realized rewards and the algorithm, whereas in (4) it is also taken over the prior. The last summand in (3) is the expected reward of the algorithm.
Per-instance regret allows to capture "nice" MAB instances. Define the gap of a problem instance µ as ∆ = µ * − max i:µi<µ * µ i , where µ * = max i µ i . In words: the difference between the largest and the second largest expected reward. One way to characterize "nice" MAB instances is via large gap. There are MAB algorithms with regret O(min(
T log T )) for a constant number of arms [Auer et al. 2002a ]. The basic performance guarantee is expressed via Bayesian regret. Bounding the per-instance regret is particularly useful if the prior is not exactly known to the principal, or if the prior that everyone believes in may not quite the same as the true prior. In general, a per-instance regret also guards against "unlikely realizations". Besides, a bound on the per-instance regret is valid for every realization of the prior, which is reassuring for the social planner and also could take advantage of "nice" realizations such as the ones with large "gap".
Conditional expectations. Throughout, we often use conditional expectations of the form E[A|B = b] and E[A|B] where A and B are random variables. To avoid confusion, let us emphasize that E[A|B = b] evaluates to a scalar, whereas E[A|B] is a random variable that maps values of B to the corresponding conditional expectations of A. At a high level, we typically use E[A|B = b] in the algorithms' specifications, and we often consider E[A|B] in the analysis.

BASIC BUILDING BLOCK: SAMPLING THE INFERIOR ARM
A fundamental problem in designing an algorithm for BIC bandit exploration is to incentivize agents to choose any arm i ≥ 2 even once, as initially they would only choose arm 1. (Recall that arms are ordered according to their prior mean rewards.) While the special case of deterministic rewards and independent priors was solved in Kremer et al. [2014] , we solve the general case: stochastic rewards and correlated priors. Moreover, our algorithm gives a very simple alternative for deterministic rewards (which is not Bayesian optimal), and mainly provides an important building block and intuition for our subsequent results.
We focus on the case of two arms for cleaner exposition. Extension to many arms, which requires some additional ideas, is postponed to the full version.
Restricting the prior. We need to restrict the prior P so that we have a fighting chance, because our problem is hopeless for some priors. For an easy example, consider a prior such that µ 1 and µ 1 − µ 2 are independent. Then samples from arm 1 have no bearing on the conditional expectation of µ 1 − µ 2 , so an algorithm that only sees these samples cannot possibly incentivize an agent to try arm 2.
For a "fighting chance", we assume that after seeing sufficiently many samples of arm 1 there is a positive probability that arm 2 is better. To state this property formally, we denote with S k 1 the random variable that captures the first k outcomes of arm 1, and we let
be the conditional expectation of µ 2 − µ 1 as a function S k 1 . We make the following assumption: From the set P of the next L agents, pick one agent p0 uniformly at random;
4
Every agent p ∈ P − {p0} is recommended arm a * ;
5
Player p0 is recommended arm 2 end In fact, Property (P1) is "almost necessary", in the sense that it is necessary for a strongly BIC algorithm; see the full version for a proof.
Algorithm and analysis. We provide a simple BIC algorithm that samples both arms at least k times. The time is divided into k + 1 phases of L rounds each, except the first one, where L is a parameter that depends on the prior. In the first phase the algorithm recommends arm 1 to K = max{L, k} agents, and picks the "exploit arm" a * as the arm with a highest posterior mean conditional on these K samples. In each subsequent phase, it picks one agent independently and uniformly at random to explore arm 2. All other agents exploit using arm a * . A more formal description is given in Algorithm 1. We prove that the algorithm is BIC as long as L is larger than some prior-dependent constant. The idea is that, due to information asymmetry, an agent recommended arm 2 does not know whether this is because of exploration or exploitation, but knows that the latter is much more likely. For large enough L, the expected gain from exploitation exceeds the expected loss from exploration, making the recommendation BIC.
LEMMA 3.1. Let k P be the constant from Property (P1) and
) is BIC and collects at least k samples from both arms as long as
Note that the denominator in (5) is strictly positive by Property (P1).
5
PROOF. The BIC constraint is trivially satisfied in the initial phase. By a simple observation from Kremer et al. [2014] , which also applies to our setting, it suffices to show that an agent is incentivized to follow a recommendation for arm 2.
Focus on one phase n ≥ 2 of the algorithm. For each agent p in this phase, let R p 2 denote the event that this agent is recommended arm 2. Let Z = µ 2 − µ 1 . It suffices to prove that E[Z|R p 2 ] ≥ 0, i.e., that the agent is not incentivized to switch to arm 1. Observe that the event R p 2 is uniquely determined by the initial samples S K 1 and by the random bits of the algorithm, which are independent of Z. Thus by the law of iterated expectations:
. There are two possible disjoint events under which agent p is recommended arm 2: either E 1 = {X > 0} or E 2 = {X ≤ 0 and p = p 0 }. Thus,
Observe that:
Moreover, X is independent of the event {p = p 0 }. Therefore, we get:
.
The latter inequality follows from a property of random variables, where one is a filtration of the other, which we prove in the full version. Essentially, it holds because X = X K conditions on more information than Y = X kP : respectively, the first K samples and the first k P samples of arm 1, where K ≥ k P .
We will overload the notation and refer to IC-SAMPLE(k), which should be interpreted as IC-SAMPLE(k, L) with L set using Equation (5) (with equality).
To give some more intutition on the constants L, k P and on the random variable Y that we used so far, we present a concrete example where the arms are independent, the prior of each arm is a Normal distribution and the rewards are normally distributed conditional on their mean.
Example 3.2 (Gaussian rewards). We will consider the notation: N (µ, σ
2 ) to denote a normal with mean µ and variance σ 2 . Suppose that µ i are independent, the prior on each µ i is normal N (µ ). Thus we can also re-write:
] is a linear transformation of a Normal distribution and therefore is distributed according to
Thus:
Observe that as k → ∞, the variance of X k increases and converges to the variance σ 2 1 of the prior. Intuitively, more samples can move the posterior further away from the prior mean µ 0 i and in the limit of many samples X k will be distributed exactly the same as µ 
BLACK BOX REDUCTION FROM ANY ALGORITHM
In this section we present a "black-box reduction" that uses a given bandit algorithm A as a black box to create a BIC algorithm A IC for BIC bandit exploration, with only a minor increase in Bayesian regret (proofs from this section appear in the full version).
At a high level the reduction works as follows. There are two parameters: priordependent constants k, M . We start with a "sampling stage" during which we collect k samples of each arm in only a constant number of rounds. (The sampling stage is implemented in Sections 3 and extended to many arms in the full version.) Then we proceed in phases of M rounds each. In each phase, we pick one round uniformly at random and dedicate it to A. We run A in the "dedicated" rounds only, ignoring the feedback from all other rounds. In the non-dedicated rounds, we recommend an "exploit arm": an arm with the largest posterior mean reward conditional on the samples collected in the previous phases. A more formal description is given in Algorithm 2. Pick one agent p from the M agents in the phase uniformly at random;
7
Every agent in the phase is recommended i * n , except agent p who is recommended in;
8
Let (in, ri n ) be the sample for arm in and s n the set of all samples collected in this phase;
9
Return (in, ri n ) to algorithm A;
11
Set S n+1 = S n ∪ s n end As in the previous section, we make an assumption on the prior P.
(P2) Let Λ k be a random variable representing k i ≥ k samples from each action i. There exist prior-dependent constants k * P < ∞ and τ P , ρ P > 0 such that
Intuitively, the statement says, that there is some sufficiently large number k, such that if the algorithm sees k new samples of each arm, then there is a constant probability, that any single arm i is "a posteriori" the best arm and by a margin τ P . For instance, if the prior P puts some positive probability on the event that {µ i − max j̸ =i µ j ≥ τ }, then it is reasonable, that since the conditional expectations after sufficiently many samples are relatively close to the true means, property (P2) should hold. We present a formal such argument in the full version.
We deliberately state our assumption in such an abstract manner, so as to make our theorem as inclusive as possible and avoid technicalities that have to do with convergence properties of Bayesian estimators, which dilute our main message. In the full version we give natural sufficient conditions on the distributions P and D that imply property (P2). For instance, property (P2) is satisfied when the rewards are drawn from the exponential family of distributions or are binary and the prior P is continuous and has full support. 
where c P and L P are two constant that depend only on the prior P.
COROLLARY 4.3 (REGRET GUARANTEE). If the Bayesian regret of a bandit algorithm A when run for T time-steps is R P (T ), then the Bayesian regret of algorithm A
IC when run for T time-steps is at most
where C and M are some prior dependent constant.
The proofs of these Theorems appear in the full version. Observe, that if we use an optimal bandit algorithm A, such as the UCB algorithm, which achieves Bayesian regret of c √ T for some c, then we get that algorithm A IC achieves regret of C + c √ M T .
INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE ACTIVE ARMS ELIMINATION: NON-BAYESIAN REGRET
So far we have argued only about Bayesian regret. From the perspective of the designer it is interesting to have guarantees not only in expectation over the prior but also for each possible instance realization of the means µ i . Our algorithms so far were giving too much importance on the prior by repeatedly performing posterior updates and playing the arm with the highest posterior mean quite frequently. It is hard to believe that such an approach could yield worst-case regret over all instances, since there will be instances where the best arm according to the posterior is much worse than the true best arm. Moreover, the fact that our algorithms relied on performing posterior updates, implies that to implement the algorithms the designer needs to have precise knowledge of the prior and reward distributions. Here we tackle both problems. We present detail-free algorithms, where the designer never needs to perform any posterior update. Instead of the posterior update the new algorithms use the sample average as a good proxy for the quality of each arm. For the sample averages to be good proxy's for the true posterior means and hence to imply incentive compatibility, we will need to make some assumptions on our prior distributions and on the rewards.
We will assume that the means µ i are bounded in [0, 1] and that they are distributed independently. Moreover, we will assume that the priors P i have full support in [0, 1] . Other than that we will make no other assumption (e.g., we will not need to assume property (P1) or (P2)).
One natural way of achieving ex-post regret is by using algorithms that only compare sample averages of rewards of the arms and make decisions only when such decisions can be made with high probability independently of the prior assumption. The active-arms elimination algorithm is such a process, which eliminates an arm when its sample mean reward falls far below the currently best sample mean reward.
We describe all our algorithms for the two arm case and we postpone the many arms analysis to the full version. We first present a detail-free version of the initial sampling phase, where our goal is to get k samples of the inferior arm. Then we present an incentive compatible version of active arms elimination, which will follow the initial phase. The combination leads to an incentive compatible algorithm which is detail-free (e.g., never performs posterior updates, only requires knowledge of the prior density function at one point and the mean of each prior) and which achieves min
regret for any instance of the µ i , where ∆ = |µ 1 − µ 2 |.
Detail-Free Sampling Phase
The detail-free version of the initial sampling process is very similar in structure to the IC-SAMPLE(k) process. The main difference is the way that the "exploit" arm a * is chosen, after the K samples of arm 1 are drawn. In IC-SAMPLE(k), a * was simply the arm with the highest posterior mean, given the set of samples S
In the independent prior setting, this simply means that we pick a
In the detail free version, DETAILFREE-IC-SAMPLE(k), which is described in detail in Algorithm 3, the determination of the "exploit" arm is based only on the sample averageμ K 1 of the K samples of arm 1. However, because the sample average is an "erroneous" proxy of the posterior mean, we do not pick the inferior arm 2 as the exploit arm ifμ From the set P of the next L · k agents, pick a set Q of k agents uniformly at random; 5 Every agent p ∈ P − Q is recommended arm a * ; 6 Every agent p ∈ Q is recommended arm 2
In Lemma 5.1, we show that we can set the parameters C, K and L equal to some prior-dependent constants, so that the process becomes incentive compatible. This constants require only the knowledge of the means of the priors, µ 0 1 , µ 0 2 and of the value of the CDF of prior P 1 at a single point. We deliberately give these constants, parameterized by a parameter λ, which the designer can optimally pick for each instance of the problem so as to make the length max{K, k * } + L · k of the process as small as possible. 
Elimination Phase
We now turn to the active arms elimination phase. Without incentive compatibility constraints, active arms elimination works as follows: pull both arms in a round-robin manner. At the end of each phase check whether one of the two arms can be eliminated with some "confidence". Specifically, ifμ n i are the sample averages at the beginning of phase n, then check whether |μ n 1 −μ n 2 | ≥ c(n) for some confidence function c(n). If that happens then eliminate the arm with the lower sample average and from then on only pull the better arm. Otherwise continue the round robin process.
When incentive compatibility constraints come into play we have to have collected sufficiently many samples in the initial phase so that when an agent sees a recommendation for arm 2 there is significant probability it is due to the fact that arm 1 has been eliminated and not due to exploration. We show that we can set the condition functions c(n) and the initial samples k in a manner that the algorithm is both incentive compatible and achieves asymptotically optimal regret. We again parameterize our constants by a parameter τ , which the designer is free to choose for his instance, so as to achieve optimal constants for the specific prior he is working with. 
EXTENSIONS AND GENERALIZATIONS: CONTEXTUAL BANDITS AND BEYOND
We now extend the "black-box" reduction result to a much more general setting where each agent comes with a signal (context) which can include demographics, tastes, preferences and other agent-specific information. The context, observable by both the agent and the algorithm, impacts the rewards received by this agent, as well as the agent's beliefs about these rewards. Formally, in each round t the agent has context x t , coming from some context space X and an realized reward r a,xt for each action a in the action set A, so that the tuple (x t ; r a,xt : a ∈ A) is drawn IID from some distribution. Specifically, we will assume the following parametric structure: each context x t determines the mean reward of each arm a, denoted by µ a,xt . Then conditional on the context and on the mean reward µ a,xt , the distribution of the realized reward r a,xt is drawn independently and identically from some distribution D(µ a,xt ) with mean µ a,xt . We denote with D the single-parameter family of distributions, parameterized by their mean.
Thus each arm is characterized by a vector of parameters µ a = (µ a,x ) x∈X . The joint parameter vector µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ m ) is drawn from some prior distribution P 0 and we denote with P 0 a the marginal on the a-th coordinate. Last, the context x t at iteration t is drawn i.i.d. from some distribution F and we will denote with C t the random variable that corresponds to the context of the t-th agent.
Before making the recommendation the principal observes the context and hence submits a recommendation as a function of the context. We denote with I xt t the recommended arm to agent t when his context is x t . The incentive constraints of the agent are now simply conditioned on the context: 
A policy π : X → A in a contextual bandit setting is a function that maps a context x ∈ X to an action a ∈ A. The number of possible policies increases exponentially in the cardinality of set X . Learning over these exponential space is most of the times intractable. Hence, most contextual bandit algorithms measure performance with respect to the best policy in the class Π. We will thus be interested in the Bayesian regret with respect to a policy class Π. Definition 6.2. The Bayesian regret with respect to a policy set Π is:
In the full version we show that our process for the initial sampling process and the black-box reduction of Section 4 can be generalized to the contextual setting. The main difference in the contextual setting is the definition of the "exploit" arm that is used for a agent. Unlike the non-contextual setting, the exploit arm can now be different for each agent within a phase and is decided based on her context.
To implement our algorithm we assume that we can perform the following computational tasks. First, given a context x rank all the action according to the a priori mean of the actions, i.e., E[µ a,x ]. Second, given a context x and a sample s compute the action that maximizes the a posteriori mean, i.e., arg max a E[µ a,x |S = s].
Our performance guarantees for the contextual bandits are very similar to that of the black-box reduction for standard bandits. For the rewards, given a contextual bandit algorithm A, we have again that
where c P and L P are two constant that depend only on the prior P. For the regret, given a contextual bandit algorithm A, we have again that
where R Π,P (T ) is the Bayesian regret of A with respect to class Π In the full version we give the technical assumptions we make about the distributions. Intuitively, we consider the case that context is fairly likely to repeat often, and in such cases our assumptions would give interesting performance guarantees. The incentive compatibility would always be guaranteed. We also extend the setting even further to allow for a side signal f a to be generated whenever a player pulls an arm a. This signal for instance could contain information about other arms, leading to the more general setting of partial rather than bandit feedback.
CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
We have resolved the asymptotic regret rates achieveable with incentive compatible exploration for a constant number of actions, as outlined in the Introduction. Focusing on regret minimization with a constant number of actions, we provided an algorithm with asymptotically optimal regret for BIC bandit exploration, and a general "black-box" reduction from arbitrary bandit algorithms to incentive compatible ones that works in a very general explore-exploit setting and increases the regret by at most a constant multiplicative factor. This paper sets the stage for future work in several directions. First, the most immediate technical question left open by our work is whether one can achieve Bayesian regret with constants that do not depend on the prior. Second, one would like to generalize the machine learning problem to a large (super-constant) number of actions, possibly with a known structure on the action set. 6 The latter would require handling agents' priors with complex correlations across actions. Third, the mechanism design setup could be generalized to incorporate constraints on how much information about the previous rounds must be revealed to the agents. Such constraints, arising for practical reasons in the Internet economy and for legal reasons in medical decisions, typically work against the information asymmetry, and hence make the principal's problem more difficult. Fourth, while our detail-free result does not require the algorithm to have full knowledge of the priors, ideally the principal would like to start with little or no knowledge of the priors, and elicit the necessary knowledge directly from the agents. Then the submitted information becomes subject to agent's incentives, along with the agent's choice of action.
